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Abstract—In a decentralized supply chain, raw material supply 
uncertainty, phantom orders of downstream firm as well as huge 
investment sunk costs leads to supplier’s production capacity 
manipulation behavior. A supply chain consisting of a supplier 
and a retailer who faces a newsvendor problem is considered. The 
impact of supplier’s production capacity manipulation on 
retailer’s purchase decision is discussed. The retailer can adopt a 
menu of two part tariff contract regarding the terms of trade and 
capacity. Both supplier and retailer have prior belief about 
counterpart decision behavior. Then, we construct menus of two 
part tariff contract offered by the retailer to the supplier who has 
production capacity manipulation and type dependent 
reservation profits. Our results show that when capacity 
difference between type H supplier and type L supplier is higher 
than a critical threshold, the retailer offers two kinds of optimal 
menus of two part tariff contract in view of reservation profits 
difference between the type H supplier and type L supplier, and 
that both supplier and retailer’s prior belief about counterpart 
decision behavior affect optimal menus of two part tariff contract. 
Finally, a case study shows our conclusions. 
 
Index Terms— Asymmetric information, Bullwhip effect, Capacity 




N a decentralized supply chain, the supplier often has better 
production capacity information because of its proximity to 
the upstream raw material supplier. This capacity information 
asymmetry creates an incentive problem, i.e., the supplier can 
influence the downstream firm’s production or assembly 
decision by cheating his forecast. Anticipating this, the 
downstream firm does not consider the capacity information to 
be credible. This improper action leads to significant profit 
losses for both parties. Finally, the consumer also suffers from 
higher retail’s price and lack of product availability. 
Capacity manipulation is also bound up with the downstream 
firm purchase decision. Personal computer (PC) and electronics 
manufacturers often submit “phantom orders” to induce their 
suppliers to secure more component capacity (Lee et al. 1997). 
In 2001, Solectron, a major electronics supplier, had $4.7 
billion in excess component inventory because of inflated 
forecasts provided by its customers (Engardio 2001). 
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Analyzing such forecast inflation, the supplier may discount the 
forecast provided by its customers. Furthermore, huge capacity 
investment sunk costs can also further deteriorate capacity 
manipulation. As a result, raw materials supply uncertainty, 
phantom orders of downstream firm and huge sunk investment 
costs lead to importance of study of supplier production 
capacity manipulation. 
The purpose of this paper is to show the impact of supplier 
production capacity information on retailer’s purchase 
decision. We study a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a 
retailer who faces a newsvendor problem. The supplier has 
better knowledge of his production capacity than the retailer 
has. We model this problem as a game of adverse selection. In 
this model, the retailer (principal) offers a menu of two part 
tariff contracts, each of which consists of two parameters: the 
slotting payments and wholesale price. The supplier (agent), 
who has alternative opportunities and associated reservation 
profits, either chooses one from the menu of contracts or rejects 
them all. Generalizing the traditional contracts, we consider 
type dependent reservation profits for type L and type H 
suppliers. We derive an optimal two part tariff contract menu 
for the retailer under this generalization. 
Both supplier and retailer have prior belief about 
counterpart decision behavior. We start with a newsvendor 
retailer offers deterministic two part tariff contract to supplier 
under symmetric production capacity case. Retailer receives 
slotting payments and places an order at the wholesale price. 
Then we construct menus of two part tariff contract offered by 
the retailer to the supplier who has production capacity 
manipulation. We show that when ratio capacity of type H 
supplier to capacity of type L supplier is higher than a critical 
threshold, the retailer offers two kinds of optimal menus of two 
part tariff in view of reservation profits difference between the 
type H supplier and type L supplier. We also show that both 
supplier and retailer’s prior belief about counterpart decision 
behavior affect optimal menus of two part tariff contract. 
Finally, we identify characteristics of the business environment 
that make menus of two part tariff contract particularly 
valuable. 
Two-part tariffs are widely used in business-to-business 
contracts, where their popularity is second only to linear prices. 
Two-part tariffs can be categorized to two following types: the 
dominant supplier (upstream) and the dominant buyer 
(downstream). The literatures on a dominant-supplier 
supplying a regular product have considered in detail the 
two-part tariffs contract with format (F, w); i.e., supplier 
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charges a lump-sum side (or franchising) payment F besides 
wholesale price w. It is easy to know that, under information 
symmetry, two part tariff contract enables a dominant-supplier 
to perfectly coordinate the channel (Hua,H 2008). In a 
newsvendor-product context, Weng (1999), Ha (2001), Cachon 
and Lariviere (2005) have considered two part tariff contract. In 
contrast, there are few literatures of two part tariff contract 
focusing on dominant-buyer (downstream). In the game theory 
literatures, Lau,A (2008) is closely related to our problems in 
that they consider two part tariff contract from buyer 
perspective, but their focus is on a dominant retailer purchases a 
newsvendor-type product from a manufacturer under 
asymmetric unit manufacturing cost, our results will imply that 
supplier has production capacity manipulation behavior and 
type-dependent reservation profits. 
One of major difficulties on supply chain management is 
bullwhip effect. Lee et al. (1997) provided four reasons for 
distortion of demand forecasts, such as the rationing game and 
order batching; they don’t mention the player’s artificial 
manipulation as a reason for forecast inflation, which give rise 
to asymmetric information. Asymmetric information results 
from demand uncertainty, supply uncertainty, lead time 
uncertainty and so on, but another reason is member artificial 
manipulation based on individual benefits. At present, some 
considered artificial manipulation, such as Özer, Ö (2006), 
Terry A. Taylor (2007), Anand.K. et al. (2008), Cakanyildirm 
M (2007) and Su (2008). Özer, Ö (2006) characterized that the 
manufacturer often manipulate demand forecast information 
because of her better belief about consumers in a decentralized 
supply chain, and can affect the supplier’s capacity decision by 
phantom orders. Thus, the supplier does not consider the 
forecast information provided by the manufacturer to be 
credible and offers nonlinear capacity reservation contract and 
advance purchase contract to obtain credibly manufacturer’s 
forecast information. Anand K. et al. (2008) studied that the 
buyer purchases component from supplier and may control 
inventories from the first period to the later period. The 
strategic inventories are a powerful technique in the hands of 
the buyer in which serve as a deterrent to the supplier’s 
monopoly power in later periods, but, this threat is inversely 
proportional to his holding costs. Su (2008) summarized that 
the seller can do better by creating artificial shortages in view of 
seasonal products, and argued that scarcity also serves as a 
marketing tool in generating hype and allure, which further 
increases the desirability of the product. Taylor A T (2007) 
shown that a firm developing an innovative product, due to 
market pressures, cannot supply a precise, court enforceable 
contract of product and production process. Without this 
contract, the supplier faces a classic hold-up problem and may 
underinvest in capacity. Thus, the buyer can offer relational 
contract to supplier, but he must procure more than his demand 
to indirectly monitor the supplier’s capacity investment. We 
also study downstream firm purchases product from upstream 
firm, but we consider menus of two part tariff contract offered 
by buyer to supplier who has capacity manipulation to 
maximize firm’s expected profits. Cakanyildirm M.(2007) 
shown that type-dependent reservation profits of supplier 
influence the buyer behavior under asymmetric production cost 
information, their focus is deterministic or menus of revenue 
sharing contracts. Our paper will study deterministic or menus 
of two part tariff contracts. 
 This paper is organized as follows: In Section II some 
assumptions are analyzed; In Section III, we will solve the 
retailer's profit maximization problem under symmetric 
capacity information case; In section IV, we will deal with the 
retailer's profit maximization problem when the supplier holds 
capacity manipulation behavior, and the case that retailer 
War-mart purchases apparel from upstream L.L.Bean is also 
discussed, The paper is concluded in Section V.  
II. ASSUMPTIONS 
Consider a supply chain with a risk-neutral supplier (denoted 
by “S”) and a risk-neutral retailer (denoted by “R”). The retailer 
faces a newsvendor problem and makes a single purchase of a 
product from the supplier. The supplier's capacity is not known 
before offering a two part tariff contract because of uncertainty 
of raw material supply. However, the supplier knows more 
about his production capacity than the retailer does. 
Let the random variable ξ denotes the supplier's production 
capacity. We assume for simplicity that ξ is a discrete random 
variable with two possible outcomes: ξl and ξh with ξl <ξh. We 
consider only two types of suppliers, namely high capacity 
supplier and low capacity supplier denoted by L and H, 
respectively. The supplier will be type L if he knows that he 
will get his raw materials from the low provider, i.e., his 
production capacity will be ξl. Otherwise, he is of type H, and 
his production capacity will be ξh.      
Initially, neither the supplier nor the retailer knows which 
type the supplier is. By the time of choosing a contract, 
however, the supplier's type is realized and observed by the 
supplier whereas the retailer does not still observe supplier’s 
type, and has belief about her supplier’s type L with probability 





hπ ) denote the supplier's reservation profit when 
she is type L (H), this reservation profit is the minimum gain of 
supplier’s alternate opportunity. Profits minlπ and minhπ are not 
necessarily equal. 
Let r be the retail price per unit. f( ) and F() be the density and 
cumulative distribution functions of the retailer demand, 
respectively. Assume F() is continuous, s denotes the salvage 
value and c denotes supplier’s unit production cost. 
Under asymmetric capacity information, let β and 1-β denote 
supplier learn about information probability of retailer’s 
purchase quantity ξl and ξh. Furthermore, β and 1-β are also 
common knowledge between S and R. 
 
III. SYMMETRIC CAPACITY INFORMATION SCENARIO 
In this section, we will analyze the case when both the R and 
the S have the same production capacity information. Assume 
that R is stackelberg leader. Known probability of type L and 
type H supplier, R can offer a two part tariff contract to S, in 
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which specified lump-sum side or “slotting” payment F and 
purchase at the wholesale price w. This contract can be 
represented by a pair of parameters (F, w). Then, we have the 
following theorem 1. 
THEOREM 1 Under symmetric capacity information, R offer 
optimal two part tariff contract ),( ∗∗ ll wF  to type L supplier 
when the supplier type is L; R offer optimal two part tariff 
contract ),( ∗∗ hh wF  to type H supplier when the supplier type 
is H, where 
     )()( lll fsrrw ξξ−−=
∗ , 
min2 )()()( lllll fsrcrF πξξξ −−−−=
∗ , 
)()( hhh fsrrw ξξ−−=
∗ ,
min2 )()()( hhhhh fsrcrF πξξξ −−−−=
∗ . 
PROOF.  Let lF denotes the R receive slotting payment from S 
when the supplier type is L and purchase at the wholesale price 
lw . The retailer want to maximize his expected profit, while 
ensuring that the supplier's expected profit is higher than his 
reservation profit. The retailer’s optimal two part tariff contract 
can find ),( ll wF  as follows. 
          +−−−+− )()(max
),(
dEsrFwr lllllwF lL
ξξξ           (1) 
             ..ts  minlllll Fcw πξξ ≥−− ,                                     (2) 
                     0, ≥ll wF ,  
   Note that )0,max()( dd ll −=−
+ ξξ .  
As receiving slotting payment lF  under the two part tariff 
contract ),( ll wF , R will offer the optimal wholesales price 
∗
lw  for the channel by solving the newsvendor problem. 
Considering 0/])()([ =∂−−−−∂ + lllll dEsrwr ξξξξ , 
we have )()( lll fsrrw ξξ−−=
∗ . Under symmetric 
capacity information, type L supplier only capture reservation 
profits, it is easy to see that the solution of the problem is 
min2 )()()( lllll fsrcrF πξξξ −−−−=
∗ .  
The retailer problem for type H supplier, we can use similar 
procedure  to prove.  □ 
 
IV. CAPACITY MANIPULATION SCENARIO 
In the case of asymmetric information, the retailer does not 
know if the supplier will be of type L or type H, but knows that 
the supplier is of type L with probability α and of type H with 
probability 1-α. So the menus of two part tariff contracts 
offered by the retailer can be represented by 
)},(),,{( hhll wFwF , where ),( ll wF (resp. ),( hh wF ) is 
designedly for the supplier of type L (resp. H).  
The sequence of events is as follows: 
 (1) The R provides a menu of two part tariff contracts 
)},(),,{( hhll wFwF  to the S. Here, the R’s objective is to 
find the optimal menu of two part tariff contract that maximizes 
his profit.   
(2)Given this menu, the supplier then either accepts a 
contract ),( ii wF  or rejects both contracts, where lhi ,= . 
 (3)If the supplier accepted contracts, she will choose a 
particular contract that maximizes her profit. Specifically, if the 
S declares his capacity information to be ξh, then the retailer 
receives the payments hF   and purchase quantity either ξh or ξl 
at wholesale price hw .  
(4)The S produces quantity either ξl   or ξh and delivers to R.  
(5)The retailer receives the order and sells at unit price r>0. 
Leftover units can be sold in an exogenous salvage market at s 
per unit. 
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that the supplier learns about 
probability of retailer’s purchase quantity ξl and ξh with 
probability β and 1-β. If the supplier chooses contract 
),( ll wF  when he is of type H, his expected profits will 
be hlllLSh cFw ξξπ −−= ; if the supplier chooses contract 
),( hh wF  when he is of type L, his expected profit is as 
follows:        
])[( hlhHSl Fcw −−= ξβπ  
])())[(1( 2λξξξβ lhhlh Fcw −−−−−+ .     (4) 
PROOF.  (1) When supplier declares her choice of contracts to 
the buyer of type H, due to retailer’s order quantity of hξ  or 
lξ , supplier could produce lξ  to deal with R’s low purchase 
quantity. If R’s order quantity is higher than S’s products, S 
will pay to R 1λ  per unit, on the other hand, if R’s order 
quantity is less than S’s products, S will charge 2λ  per unit, 
this compensation of capacity can help to prevent S from 
cheating. Furthermore, the supplier learn about probability of 
retailer’s purchase quantity lξ  and hξ  with probability β  
and β−1 , where β  and β−1  are common knowledge 
between S and R. If the supplier is of type L, the expected 
profits of S is as follows：   
])[( hlhHSl Fcw −−= ξβπ  
])())[(1( 2λξξξβ lhhlh Fcw −−−−−+ . 
 (2) When supplier declares his choice of contracts designedly 
for the supplier of type L, the R argues that the S’s product 
quantity only for lξ , so order quantity is lξ . If the supplier is 
type H, expected profits of S satisfies： 
hlllLSh cFw ξξπ −−= .  
Based on the revelation principle (Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1991)), there is an optimal contract menu of the supplier will 
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choose the contract that is intended for his type. The supplier, 
by choosing a contract, truthfully reveals his production 
capacity information. According to the revelation principle, the 
retailer will solve the following problem to maximize her 
expected profit. 
))1(()[1(max 321)},(),,{( HHHhhll wFwF
ααβαα −+−+  
)])1()(1( 54 HH ααβ −+−+  
    ..ts   .PC    minlLSl ππ ≥ ,                                                  (5) 
                        minhHSh ππ ≥ ,                                                  (6) 
.IC   HSlLSl ππ ≥ ,                                                   (7) 
LShHSh ππ ≥ ,                                                           (8) 
0,,, ≥hhll wFwF ,                                       (9) 
where llll wFdrEH ξξ −+= ),min(1 , 
lhhl wFdrEH ξξ −+= ),min(2 ,  
23 )(),min( λξξξξ lhlhhl wFdrEH −−−+= , 
lllLSl Fcw −−= ξπ )( , 
14 )(),min( λξξξξ lhlhhl wFdrEH −+−+= , 
hhhh wFdrEH ξξ −+= ),min(5 ,   
])()[( 2λξξξβπ lhhlhHSh Fcw −+−−=  
hhh Fcw −−−+ ξβ ))[(1( . 
Constraints (5) and (6) are called participation constraints 
(PC). They guarantee that each type of supplier earns at least 
his reservation profit when he chooses the designed contract for 
his type. The left side of constraint (7) is the expected profit of 
the type L supplier when he chooses the designed contract for 
his type, while the right side is his profit when he chooses the 
designed contract for the supplier of high type. The explanation 
of (8) is similar to that of (7). Constraints (7) and (8) are called 
incentive compatibility constraints (IC). These constraints state 
that each supplier type prefers the contract that is designed for 
his type. The following theorem characterizes optimal menus of 
two part tariff contract offered by R when supplier has capacity 
manipulation behavior. 
THEOREM 2. Suppose that the ratio capacity of type H 














 (i) If 12
2minmin )/()( λβλβξξππ ++≥−− clhlh , 
 the optimal menus of two part tariff contract offered by the 
retailer is )},(),,{( /// hhll wFwF
∗ , where 
)1/()( 12
/ βλβλ −+−= cwh  
)])(1/[()( minmin lhlh ξξβππ −−−+ , 




















2minmin )/()( λβλβξξππ ++<−− clhlh , 
Then, the optimal menus of two part tariff contract offered by 
the retailer is )},(),,{( ∧∧∗∧ hhll wFwF , where 
)])(1/[()( 12 hlh cw ξξβλβλβ +−++=
∧ ,  
))([( 12 λβλβξξ ++−=
∧ cF lhh 2)( λξξβ lh −+  














lhlhl cF ξξλβλβξξ +++−=
∧  
))(())1(( 12 λβλξξξββξ +−+−+− lhhlc  
min
hπ− llw ξ∗+ . 
PROOF. We consider S’s manipulation behavior, namely, 
supplier declares her choice of contracts designedly for the 
supplier of type H. Therefore, the supplier aims to increase his 
expected profits. Since the retailer does not want to pay more 
than the high type's reservation profit, i.e., constraints (6) 
should be binding in the optimal solution of R. To meet the low 
type from choosing the designed contract for high type, the 
retailer must therefore increase the low type supplier’s 
expected profit and thus decrease her own profit. However, the 
retailer only increases the low type supplier's expected profit as 
much as necessary, until constraints (7) becomes binding. 
Furthermore, when the supplier declares her choice of contracts 
designedly for the supplier of type L, retailer only orders 
quantity of lξ  at wholesale price
∗
lw .  In other words, order 
quantities under this situation are equal to amount of purchase 
under symmetric capacity information case because the retailer 
only purchase quantity of lξ . The optimization of R’s problem 
above can be reflected to following problem in which supplier 






−+−−− ∗    
Δ+−−+ hh w])1)(1( ξβα  
..ts  min)( llll Fcw πξ ≥−−
∗ ,                                           (10) 
hhlh Fcw −−+− ))1()(( ξββξ    
min
hπ= 2)( λξξβ lh −− ,                  (11) 
1)()( λξξξ lhhlllh FFww −=−+−




∗−−+− ))1()((  
lhhlh FFc −+−−−≥ ξλξξβ 2)(  ,       (13) 
where,
),min()]1)(1()1([ drE lξαβαβαα −−+−+=Δ  
),min()1()1( 2 drE hξβα −−+  
1))(1)(1( λξξβαα lh −−−+  
2
2 )()1( λξξαβ lh −−−  
To substitute (11) and (12) into the objective function and 
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Remarks: The aforementioned theorem characterizes that 
when capacity difference between type H supplier and type L 
supplier is increasing and higher than a critical threshold, due to 
phantom orders of retailer, as well as huge sunk cost, supplier 
manipulate capacity to gain from cheating and avoiding order 
shrinkage of the downstream firm. In other words, capacity 
difference greatly influences buyer purchase decision via 
supplier’s manipulation behavior. If reservation profits 
difference between type L supplier and type H supplier is 
increasing, type L supplier can obtain more gains from 
pretending to announce selection of contract designedly to type 
H supplier, which result to manipulation behavior.  
At a result, both capacity difference and reservation profits 
difference affect supplier manipulation behavior, further 









 determines that the retailer offers two kinds of 
optimal menus of two part tariff. The following corollary 
illustrates that both supplier and retailer’s prior belief about 
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the result is clear. 
According to expression of lh ξξ / , both supplier and 
retailer’s prior belief about counterpart decision behavior affect 
optimal menus of two part tariff contracts, i.e., βα ,  greatly 
affect optimal contracts and expected profits. Corollary 1 
shows that wholesale price offered by the retailer is decreasing 
in β , illustrating supplier who has better belief  about R’s 
purchase behavior prefers more production manipulation, thus, 
wholesale prices is lower. On the other hand, slotting payments 
have closely related to βα , , but not explicit variable 
relationship.  
In summary, capacity difference, reservation profit 
difference, both supplier and retailer’s belief about counterpart 
decision behavior which reflects private information game will 
influence optimal menus of two part tariff contracts offered by 
the retailer to the supplier. 
For example, in the past decades many powerful retail chains 
have appeared around the world, owners of many major 
international brands outsource much of their manufacturing 
activities to independent upstream firms. Thus, the dominant 
retailer scenario, such as Wal-mart, Carrefour, becomes 
increasingly prevalent and important. We study the case that 
Wal-mart purchases apparel from L.L.Bean. Due to 
components of apparel supply uncertainty, phantom orders of 
Wal-mart as well as huge R&D costs leads to L.L.Bean’s 
production capacity manipulation behavior. Wal-mart offers 
menus of two part tariff contract to L.L.Bean in order to 
maximize her profits.  
Two-part tariffs are composed of two components, lump-sum 
side (or ‘‘franchising’’) payment F as well as wholesale price w, 
where franchising payment is equivalent to site lease fees in 
Wal-mart locations. On the other hand, Wal-mart is a 
stackelberg leader because of powerful sale amounts and 
sophisticated information networks, offering wholesale price to 
L.L.Bean based on prior belief about counterpart’s capacity 






The purpose of this paper is to show the impact of supplier 
production capacity information on retailer’s purchase 
decision. One of major difficulties on supply chain 
management is bullwhip effect. Asymmetric information and 
artificial manipulation result in mismatch between supply and 
demand, which giving rise to market mediation costs, namely, 
cost of overstocking or understocking products. But, there are 
few literatures on the player’s artificial manipulation as a 
reason for forecast inflation and capacity deception, which give 
rise to asymmetric information. Practitioners and theoretical 
literatures increasingly focus on asymmetric information 
resulting from member artificial manipulation based on 
individual benefits in supply chain.  
Two-part tariffs are widely used in business-to business 
contracts, where their popularity is second only to linear prices. 
They have been extensively studied by researchers in 
economics and business. We use two part tariff contract to 
study that dominant downstream firm offers to upstream firm. 
We construct menus of two part tariff contract offered by the 
retailer to the supplier who has production capacity 
manipulation and type dependent reservation profits. We 
conclude that when capacity difference between type H 
supplier and type L supplier is higher than a critical threshold, 
the retailer offers two kinds of optimal menus of two part tariff 
in view of difference between reservation profits of the type H 
supplier and type L supplier. In other words, menus of two part 
tariff contract are influenced by capacity difference and 
reservation profits between type L and type H supplier. At the 
same time, both supplier and retailer’s prior belief about 
counterpart decision behavior affect optimal menus of two part 
tariff contract.  
Further study will extend risk-neutral supplier to bounded 
rationality to illustrating the impact of manipulation of risk 
aversion of supplier to downstream firm purchase decision. 
Another perspective is that explore downstream firm purchase 
decision by relational contracts based on long term trust and 
coordination. Furthermore, further research is needed to 
identify simple-yet-effective menus of two part tariff contracts 
in the presence of such asymmetries. Another avenue is 
accounted for strategic downstream firm behavior. We also 
note that most related academic studies on the 
dominant-supplier scenario consider contract formats that are 
already in use in the real-world. In contrast, practical 
dominant-retailer implemented contract formats are not yet 
widely enacted. 
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